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The aim of this article is to analyse the process of socialisation taking place at the 
level of the Council Working Groups (CWGs) dealing with the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Based on recent empirical evidence, this article explains the 
main codes of conduct adopted by the national diplomats in the CFSP CWGs, such as 
the reflex coordination or consensus-building practice. Compliance with these rules 
stems from strategic calculations based on legitimacy concerns and the long-term 
perspective of the negotiations. Hence, in this case, the internalisation of norms has 
not taken place yet. Even though this view may suggest a conceptualisation of 
national representatives in the CWGs as passive “national champions”, it is argued 
here that they might also play a role in influencing the position of their capitals, 
mainly through the process of formulating the instructions.  
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Introduction 
 
Socialisation processes among national diplomats in Brussels were already 
identified in the early CFSP literature (de Schoutheete, 1980; Nuttall, 1992); 
nonetheless, an in-depth analysis about how socialisation takes place or what has been 
its impact on the policy-process or the policy-substance is still missing. This article 
aims, first, at establishing whether the socialisation argument is still valid nowadays, 
and second, at providing some empirical evidence regarding under which conditions 
this process occurs. Contrary to previous analyses, attention is paid to the lower levels 
of the decision-making system, i.e. the CWGs. It is argued here that they should not 
be underestimated since they play a significant role in the EU’s Foreign Policy 
making.  
 
This article also intends to join the discussion on the nature of the socialisation 
process taking place within the EU institutions. Socialisation has often been 
conceived as a process of internalisation of the rules and norms of a group, implying a 
switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness. This article 
explores whether or not this has also been the case in the CWGs, where interactions 
occur among national representatives embedded in two environments: national and 
European one. In this case, the analysis is primarily concerned with the adaptation to 
the formal and informal rules of behaviour within the CWGs.  
 
                                                 
* This paper has been published in European Integration on-line Papers (EIoP), vol. 10, no. 11, 2006, 
accessible at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2006_011a/34 The article is based on more than 70 in-depth interviews conducted by both 
authors in Brussels with national representatives to the CWGs and EU officials 
(Commission and Council Secretariat General) in 2005 and early 2006.
1 Some data 
comes also from an on-line survey conducted by the authors and filled in by 30 
national representatives from 12 different CWGs. Overall, the research targeted 
diplomats from 20 Member States. The empirical evidence is complemented by 
participant observation in the CWGs meetings in 2005 and secondary literature. 
 
The article begins with a discussion concerning the concept of socialisation, 
referring to the ongoing debate in the academic literature. It is then argued that in the 
case of the CFSP CWGs, strategic action appears as the main mechanism behind 
socialisation. The article then moves on to explain the institutional setting of the 
CFSP CWGs and continues with an analysis of the codes of conduct. Finally, the 
question of actors’ legitimacy and credibility is raised. These factors are high at stake 
among national representatives, who take them into account in the long-term strategic 
planning of the negotiations. Finally, the article tackles the issue of 
misunderstandings/tensions between the officials in the capitals and in Brussels, 
which points to the role of the national representatives as change agents in national 
foreign policies.  
 
Socialisation as a strategic action 
 
The approach presented in this article adopts as a starting point the rational 
actor: even in highly institutionalised frameworks, rationality plays a crucial role in 
determining actors’ behaviour.  Actors are reflexive and take into account the social 
and normative context in which they find themselves when acting strategically. As it 
will be shown later in this article, national diplomats seconded to Brussels are not just 
shaped by the structure –i.e. they are not “structural idiots” (Beyers, 2005: 933)–, but 
they are also reactive and ‘self-reflective’. This means that they are able to interpret 
their own behaviour (Glarbo, 1999: 648). This article advocates a model which 
situates self-reflective actors within an institutional context. This standpoint underpins 
our understanding of socialisation processes in the CWGs.  
 
In sociological analyses, socialisation has been conceptualised as a ‘process by 
which social interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling 
and acting’ (Johnston, 2001: 493).
2 This results in the establishment of a ‘we-feeling’ 
among the policy-makers and may lead to emergence of a common ‘role identity’ 
(Deutsch, 1957: 5-7). For the purpose of this study, socialisation is defined as 
adaptation of certain rules of behaviour, ‘ways of doing things’, stemming from 
interaction with members of the same group. This definition does not imply 
internationalisation of rules and norms at the very moment actors enter into the new 
environment or group.
3 Instead, they start a process of learning the group’s rules and 
simultaneously participate in the group’s dynamics and legitimisation of appropriate 
behaviours. Only later, this process may result in the internalisation of the code of 
conduct. Such internalisation means ‘taken for grantedness’, so that the values and 
rules, ‘are not only hard to change, but that the benefits of behaviour are calculated 
in abstract social terms rather than concrete consequential terms’ (Johnston, 2001: 
495).
 In other words, there is a switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness (Checkel, 2005).  
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distinguished two types of internalisation (Checkel, 2005). Type I Internalisation 
implies that actors follow the rules of the community or group in which they are 
embedded without reflecting on whether they are or not the right thing to do. Actors 
would be just playing the role that it is socially expected. Type II Internalisation will 
be a step further in the internalisation of rules and norms (ibid: 804). In this case 
actors adopt the rules of the group because they consider that these rules are the “right 
thing to do” which would imply a change in values and interests following a logic of 
appropriateness. The authors also identify three mechanisms for socialization: role 
playing, normative suasion and strategic calculation (ibid: 808). In the first one, actors 
adopt the norms because they are appropriate in this environment (leading to Type I 
internalisation). Actors are role-players and imitate the behaviour of other members in 
the group. When asked why they follow the procedural norms they would answer: “I 
don’t know, because that’s what the others do” (ibid: 811-812). As it will be argued 
throughout this article, this is not the case in the CWGs because national diplomats 
are self-reflective and when asked about why they adopt these norms they respond in 
terms of national interest. Nonetheless, exceptionally, when they arrive to the CWGs, 
national diplomats might mimic the behaviour of their colleagues simply because they 
lack the templates. As Johnston (2005: 1021) argues such behaviour, “unlike strategic 
emulation, does not mean searching for and copying exemplars (…) It is rather a 
satisficing first step designed simply to be able to participate in the group by 
following its most basic rules”.   
 
In the case of the second mechanism, normative suasion sees actors as self-
reflecting and engaging in communicative action to persuade others. This mechanism 
leads to Type II internalisation. When asked about why they follow the procedural 
norms they would answer: “because they are the right thing to do” (ibid: 812). If this 
type of internalisation occurred in the CWGs, we would observe that national 
diplomats follow the CWGs practices even when this would be in contradiction with 
their national positions and could lead to changes in national preferences.  
 
Finally, in the case of strategic calculation, actors adopt the behavioural rules 
following social or material incentives. Strategic calculation does not involve 
internalisation of norms and hence actors follow the logic of consequences. Actors are 
strategic and self-reflective. When asked about why do they follow the procedural 
norms they would answer: “because I have to maintain my legitimacy and reputation 
within the group in order to better achieve my instructions” (ibid: 809).  
 
In the CFSP CWGs, where arguably evidence of internationalisation of norms is 
still lacking, compliance with cognitive scripts can be better explained by strategic 
factors: long-term perspective of the negotiations and reputation. Before 
internalisation occurs, socialisation may be better perceived as a strategic action 
undertaken by actors, pursuing their interests and resulting from a rational cost-benefit 
calculations (that is, the strategic calculation mechanism in Checkel, 2005). This will 
be referred to in the article as strategic socialisation. Sociological accounts of 
socialisation have underestimated the strategic use of norms and practices (Checkel, 
2005; Schimmelfennig, 2000: 135). The actors’ motivation to follow social pressures 
stems from the desire to maintain or improve their position within the group, as part 
of their long-term interest calculation. Legitimacy and reputation, factors contributing 
to one actor’s status in a group, become highly appreciated as they improve the 
  3chances of getting the national interest reflected in the policy outcome. Credibility is 
particularly important in the case of iterated negotiations, such as those taking place in 
the EU, where frequent and repetitive contacts with the same group of officials occur. 
Such conceptualisation of socialisation does not exclude that in the long-term, 
especially when actors remain in the same group for long time periods, the 
behavioural rules become naturally done things (internalised). Nonetheless, the 
empirical evidence gathered in this research does not support the last point in the case 
of the CWGs.  
 
Some scope conditions facilitating internalisation are identified by Lewis (2005: 
945-947) to guide the empirical research, among them: insulation, the density of 
issues and low level of rotation. This article provides empirical evidence that the 
above do not occur in the case of the CWGs, what may explain the lack of 
internationalisation I or II. Contrary to what happens in COREPER (ibid: 945), 
meetings in the CWGs are not insulated. Some national representatives to the CWGs 
mentioned incidents where their colleagues had been reprimanded by their COREPER 
II, PSC ambassadors or the capitals. Even other external actors can have access to 
CWGs negotiations.
4 This condition is linked with another one stated by Johnston: 
the degree of agent autonomy (2005: 1018). In those cases where there is an ample 
leeway, internationalisation is more likely to occur. National representatives in the 
CWGs have however relatively less margin of manoeuvre than their colleagues in 
COREPER.  
 
The density of issues implies a high complexity and horizontal of the meeting 
agendas dealing with various policies such as in COREPER. In contrast, the experts in 
the CWGs deal with a narrower range of issues within a geographical or functional 
area. Moreover, the level of rotation of the national representatives to the CWGs is 
higher than in other Council bodies such as COREPER or PSC (ibid: 946). Regarding 
the last scope condition, the rotation levels, national diplomats participate in the same 
CWG for an average of 2-3 years, after which they might leave for another CWG or 
return to their capitals. This high rotation prevents internalisation of behavioural rules. 
However, when national diplomats remain for longer periods in the CWGs, they 
might internalise the norms as a “reflex” or “taken-for-granted habit, without any 
conscious act of persuasion” (Checkel, 2005: 811). Before proceeding with an 
analysis of socialisation, we briefly explain the institutional setting of the CWGs. 
 
The CFSP Council Working Groups 
 
The CFSP decision-making is often described as an intergovernmental process 
of hard bargaining among Member States. This view is usually based on analyses of 
CFSP at the high political levels such as negotiations at the European Council or the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) (e.g. Moravcsik, 1993). 
Later analyses have focused on the level of ambassadors, either COREPER or PSC 
(Lewis, 2005; Duke, 2005). However, these studies underestimate the role played by 
the CWGs in the EU’s foreign policy-making. A large part of the Council workload is 
already agreed at the level of the CWGs and it reaches the PSC and/or COREPER II 
as A points in the agenda.
5 Thus, approximately 70 per cent of the total of the items in 
the GAERC agenda has been previously agreed in the CWGs and 15-20 per cent in 
COREPER (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 169). When considering these 
percentages, it has to be noted that decisions on more political or contentious issues 
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EU Special Representatives.
6  
 
With the Treaty of Maastricht, the former EPC Working Parties
7 were merged 
with their communitarian counterparts, although some CFSP-specific CWGs 
remained. The role of the CFSP CWGs is to discuss and draft CFSP documents such 
as Joint Actions, Council Conclusions, Action Plans. The CWGs are composed of 
national representatives based in the Permanent Representations in Brussels. Having 
said that, it has to be noted that the CWGs also meet in “capital formations” 
composed by officials from the MFAs. In average, they meet twice per Presidency, 
however it depends on the CWG. For example, COWEB (Western Balkans) meets 
three or four times per Presidency, whereas COTRA (Transatlantic Relations) meets 
very rarely, not even once per Presidency.
8 These “capitals” meetings serve to review 
the overall policy and raise specific issues, but no formal negotiations take place 
during the meetings. This article focuses on the first type of CWGs, composed by 
Brussels-based representatives.  
 
There are thirty-six permanent CFSP CWGs that have been set following 
thematic (Transatlantic Relations, Non-Proliferation, United Nations, Human Rights) 
or geographical lines (Western Balkans, EFTA, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
Latin America). With the development of ESDP, new CWGs have been created such 
as the EU Military Committee WG. Moreover, two committees have been established, 
dealing with the military (EU Military Committee or EUMC) and the civilian aspects 
of the EU’s crisis management policies (Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management or CIVCOM). Apart from this, one can add two specialist CWGs: the 
Nicolaidis Group and the Antici Group, in charge of preparing the agenda of the PSC 
and COREPER II, respectively. Finally, the RELEX Counsellors WG is in charge of 
ensuring horizontal co-ordination between CFSP and communitarian matters.  
 
Most of the CFSP CWGs meetings are held on a frequent basis, e.g. once or 
twice a week. Sometimes, the CWGs hold joint meetings to discuss cross-cutting 
issues, such as visa facilitation. At the level of the CWGs, there are also meetings of 
the Troika with third parties, such as the US, Canada or Russia. Not all of the CWGs 
share the same position in European foreign policy-making. As asserted by few 
practitioners, there is a feeling that the groups responsible for the most sensitive issues 
such as COTRA have a lesser say in shaping the policy than those responsible for 
other policies like COEST (Eastern and Central Asia) or COWEB. The ESDP 
committees (EUMC and CIVCOM) occupy an intermediate position between bodies 
at higher levels (COREPER II and PSC) and the CWGs. The EUMC, for example, is 
composed by senior officials from the MoD and disposes of its own preparatory body 
(the EUMC WG).  
 
Looking back: socialisation in the CFSP literature 
 
Socialisation of elites is present in the vast literature on the development of the 
EPC and later the CFSP. Different authors argued that as a consequence of repeated 
contacts and information exchange between the foreign policy makers, a process of 
socialisation emerged (Manners and Whitman, 2000; Nuttall, 1992, 2000; Smith, 
M.E., 2004; Tonra, 2001). Initially, a process known as the co-ordination reflex 
developed between the national diplomats. This was noted in the Copenhagen Report, 
  5approved in 1973. According to the document, the habit of working together had 
become “a reflex of coordination (…) which has profoundly affected the relations of 
the Member States between each other and with third countries” (as quoted in Allen 
and Wallace, 1982: 26). The EPC brought together diplomacies “in time and space on 
regular basis” and as a result “provided completely different terms for social 
integration between both national diplomacies and their individual diplomats” 
(Glarbo, 1999: 640). As Nutall (1992: 312) observed: “The (…) great success claimed 
for Political Cooperation is the phenomenon of socialisation. This is an automatic 
reflex of consultation brought by frequent personal contacts with opposite members 
from other Member States”.  
 
As a result from their participation in EPC/CFSP, national representatives were 
“exposed to a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding” (Beyers, 2002), what 
some called esprit de corps. For his part, Tonra (2001: 261) asserts that even though 
there is no evident European policy identity, there is already a “basic commitment and 
belief in joint policy-making”. A national representative, referring to the esprit de 
corps, claimed: “It does exist. People just know each other privately, invite each other 
for the meetings, also on private grounds, discuss various issues and some kind of 
community emerges… lets call it community of thinking or community of common 
views”.
9  
 
Arguably, the club-like atmosphere described in the EPC and CFSP literature, 
still exists nowadays, after the last EU enlargement. Despite often expressed doubts, 
whether this esprit de corps would continue when more actors take a seat around the 
table, a majority of the interviewees claimed that the informal cooperation has 
actually increased after the enlargement. One of them stated: “As there are now 25 
states in the room, more is done outside, drafting is often done informally”
10 and in a 
similar tone, another one asserted: “The enlargement process has strengthened the 
tendency to make all major decisions outside the formal meetings”.
11 New Member 
States have quickly learnt the importance of informal contacts between the experts at 
CWG level
12. As stated by an official of the Polish MFA: “We are learning some 
procedures. I am not talking about the formal aspects, because these are relatively 
easy to grasp. I am rather thinking of the skills to build informal coalitions, agreeing 
on positions in the corridors, in the early stage, in order to avoid clashes later on.”
13
 
One of the results of this diplomatic intersubjectivity has been the emergence of 
a common code of conducting foreign policy. Our recent empirical study on several 
external relations CWGs point to the existence and importance of such informal codes 
of practices that will be explained in the next section. 
 
Code of conduct in the CWGs 
 
A process of information sharing, so-called coordination reflex, provides the 
basis for the national officials’ work. As one of the diplomats has recently put it: “If 
you don’t exchange information, you are nobody”.
14 Even though, this consultation 
has been labelled as a “reflex” in the CFSP literature, we argue in this article that 
actors do still take into account who do they share information with and for which 
purposes (i.e. they are self-reflective). This sharing-information is perceptible in the 
increase of communicative practices among the CFSP officials.
15 Informal 
consultations prior to the meeting are part of every-day work of the representatives as 
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contacts are not so intense, cooperation and therefore, consensus is more difficult to 
be achieved. For instance, one national representative stated: 
“Because we meet in COTRA so rarely, we look at each other, but we keep our 
construction of Member States separated from the others. This psychological or 
symbolical element is probably very important in our work, in our games for the EU 
foreign policy making. But in the case of COTRA, we remain separated, we do look at 
each other, but suspiciously, (…) you don’t even find the mood for co-operation.”
16
 
Communicative practices take place through formal channels, such as the 
COREU Terminal System (CORTESY) or the mailing lists of the CWGs. 
Nonetheless, a large bulk of information-sharing is informal (for channels of 
socialisation see Box 1). The representatives remain in close contact through e-mails, 
mobile phones and frequent meetings that often occur in the corridors and over lunch. 
As one representative expressed it: “I am trying to meet my colleagues on a frequent 
basis: during the group formal meetings, but also before and afterwards, during 
lunches and any other gatherings.”
17  
 
Consultations might take place bilaterally, in a group formation or in the format 
of  confessionals with the Presidency. During these informal negotiations, national 
representatives inform other colleagues about their positions, in particular “red lines”, 
or exchange other type of information that may help the decision-making process. 
They also undertake informal negotiations in order to achieve a compromise before 
the meeting. As a result, “many issues appear ‘pre-cooked’ in the agenda, especially 
the sensitive ones”.
18 In some CWGs, so-called ‘like-minded’ groups, based on 
similar interests on certain issues, have been established in order to prepare 
beforehand their common line of action.
19 During these informal meetings, attendants 
often arrange in detail the strategy for the next CWG formal meeting: when each of 
them would intervene, what they would say and how they would reply to other 
delegations. As a consequence, the formal meeting is reduced to a mere representation 
of these “roles”. The like-minded groups operate on a very informal basis and usually 
participants credit each other with trust. As an example of this may serve an incident, 
when a higher-ranked diplomat was denied access to the group on the grounds that it 
would “infringe the group’s intimacy.”
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Channels of socialisation: 
 
¾  Regular Working Groups meetings in the Council once or twice a week.  
¾  Extraordinary meetings of the Working Groups and additional formal social 
events. 
¾  Informal meetings, with the Presidency, bilateral meetings or in a group (so 
called ‘like-minded groups’). 
¾  Meetings on private occasions. The atmosphere in the group is often very 
‘friendly’: group photos are taken at the end of presidencies, former group 
members stay in touch, visit each other, inform about personal issues even on the 
special group-mailing lists 
¾  Networks of formal and informal communication; these vary from COREU 
messages, frequent contacts via phone to mailing lists. 
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This coordination reflex also implies a tendency to take others’ views into 
account when formulating national positions (instructions). According to Ben Tonra 
(2001), many foreign policy-makers and CFSP officials acknowledged the fact that it 
became a natural reflex, i.e. they were taking into consideration what would be 
acceptable for their European partners, rather than simply what the national position, 
based on national interest would be. The reflex coordination would appear therefore 
as a habit, a naturally done thing, in contrast with rational calculations to pursue self-
interested preferences. In other words, this would be an example of role playing by 
non-reflective actors (Checkel, 2005). However, the interviews conducted by the 
authors supported the argument that national representatives are self-reflective when 
adopting the rules of the CFSP CWGs. In the case of the co-ordination reflex, it is 
seen by the diplomats as a way to increase their chances in the negotiations and avoid 
isolation in the CWG. For example, according to a practitioner, “obviously one cannot 
ignore the positions of twenty four other countries and also the Commission when 
formulating a statement – this is a starting point to avoid being left in isolation”.
21  
 
As a result of the increase of these communicative practices among national 
representatives, European states no longer feel threatened by sharing information with 
their European colleagues. On the contrary, they have multiplied their mutual 
exchanges. Some of them admit they even share selected sensitive information with 
their counterparts, in particular if it helps to reach a compromise. Such information 
includes for example circulating national instructions, security assessments or other 
political information on a strategic level.
22
 
Another code of conduct that has been identified in the CFSP literature is the 
consensus building practice. CFSP is subject to intergovernmental bargaining with 
states retaining their veto powers (with few exceptions). A national representative 
compared this with pillar I in the following way: “I was before in the MFA, dealing 
with pillar I issues, where negotiations are much tougher and you are more prepared 
to loose something. But in CFSP you can always say no. And if you are really serious 
about your no, nobody can stop you from blocking it. But this is rarely seen”.
23 
Interestingly enough, Member States do not usually make use of their veto power 
during negotiations; on the contrary, there is a general practice to ‘keep everyone on-
board’ and to achieve consensus. According to one official, “the most important thing 
is the readiness of everybody to contribute to a solution” and another mentioned 
“there is a very strong impulse to reach a compromise”.
24 The Member States’ 
diplomats try to generate a broad agreement regarding the decision, so no Member 
State is excluded (decisions by QMV) or auto-excluded (resorting to constructive 
abstention). This is a two-way process because not only will the majority try to 
integrate the minority, but also the potentially isolated state will try to find supporters, 
instead of behaving unilaterally. In other words, “you have to avoid isolation, 
especially if you are a small or medium size Member State”.
25
 
One of the main driving forces in the day-to-day CWGs practice is the search 
for agreement within the group. As stated by a diplomat “there is always a pressure to 
get an agreement, if you don’t get a result, you have nothing. (...) we have to achieve 
meaningful results, a result in substance”.
26 The national representatives often have a 
common interest in producing results at the end of the day, i.e. to be effective. Thus, it 
is not rare that at the final stages of a long meeting the pressure stemming from the 
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problem to be passed on to a higher political level.
27 Understood in these terms, 
effectiveness of the CWGs is usually high since according to practitioners and 
academics 90% to 95% of the issues in the agenda are agreed. The question here is 
why they follow this consensus-building norm. According to our findings, even when 
they give up on some issues, such consensus-oriented behaviour stems from their 
long-term calculus.  
 
Final agreement can adopt different forms: a consensus formula accepted by all 
the Member States; a compromise formula or false compromise (different readings for 
different Member States of the same document); or even a formula listing all the 
different options.
28 However, it has to be noted that in a few CWGs this effect-
oriented approach is lacking. This is the case in COTRA because of the highly 
politicised nature of the transatlantic relations. As mentioned before, the role of this 
CWG in EU’s foreign policy is very limited and similarly, the interactions among 
their members,
29 which arguably would have limited the degree of socialisation 
among them.  
  
Another principle is the existence of domaines réservés. These are issues that 
cannot be submitted to discussion and interference from the other Member States. 
Traditionally, these areas covered security issues (national defence, borders, nuclear 
status or neutrality) and special relationships. Sensitive issues are often kept out of the 
discussions in the CWGs and go straight to the higher level. That was the case with 
the negotiations on the common space on security with Russia which was only 
discussed at the PSC.
30 On the other hand, a member of a group dealing with 
transatlantic relations pointed out that any politically ‘hot’ matters in EU-US 
relations, such as Iraq, were always kept out of the discussions.
31 Other examples of 
issues that will not be discussed in the CWG given by the national diplomats 
included: broader co-operation between EU-NATO (in the EUMC WG); agreement 
on money laundering with Switzerland (in the EFTA WG); Ukrainian EU 
membership (in COEST), institutional matters; borders and bilateral issues of the EU 
Member States.
32
 
There are also more detailed rules of behaviour and often their breaching is 
perceived by others as ‘inappropriate’, leading to a decrease in one’s credibility in the 
group (see next section). These are the rules referring to the manner of presenting 
instructions, courtesy towards other group members or the language used. They 
include, for example: 
  Vertical and horizontal consistency: no contradicting in the CWG the position 
taken before on a higher level, not opening the issues previously closed in the 
CWGs on a higher political forum and definitely not contradicting the 
positions on different forums. As one of the representatives put it: 
“You have to say the same things in different fora (…) Horizontally, but also 
vertically. You have to be able to say the same thing at the technical and at 
the political level. What you say has to be the same that what your Minister 
says at the Council or your Prime Minister at the European Council. It is not 
easy, and you have sometimes countries that do not say the same thing at 
different levels. This  is badly perceived. It means that you are not serious, 
that your system does not work”.
33  
 
  9  When instructions are considered by the representative to be ‘difficult to 
justify’ within the group, they would usually resort to the phrase “according to 
my instructions…” or “according to my capital…”.
34 This is an informal sign 
to other group members, contrary to beginning your contribution with “We 
think…”. 
 
  Maintaining “positive” relations with other representatives and trying to avoid 
direct clashes of positions in the CWG are other informal practices. An official 
mentioned that “it’s very important to have emotional intelligence and of 
course, not to disturb the others. If you disturb the atmosphere in the group 
(…) you will not find a constructive attitude”.
35 This positive working 
atmosphere is crucial to facilitate consensus-building.   
 
  Members of the CWGs have to respect the policy that had been agreed 
previously in the Council Conclusions. For instance, according to one 
practitioner: “you don’t argue with the so-called agreed-language, the EU’s 
agreed policy established before. You cannot say now ‘I don’t agree with the 
Thessaloniki agenda’ ”.
36  
 
  Other rules can help to protect your legitimacy and reputation, for example,  
“there is a rule of not expressing the radical position, if there are other 
radicals in the group”,
37 i.e. hiding behind their back. 
 
  Similarly, it is in good practice to seriously consider Commission’s proposals 
as well as the deals proposed by the Presidency.  
 
Who cares about legitimacy and credibility in the CWGs? 
 
National representatives learn the ‘code of conduct’ and apply it in their 
everyday work. As mentioned above, it is often a strategic action, aimed at 
strengthening one’s position in the group and raising the chances of success in the 
future. From this perspective, adoption of the group’s rules is a tactical move, a sort of 
negotiation strategy, employed in order to achieve their goals and not because it is 
“the right thing to do”. It is due to the fact that legitimacy and credibility within the 
group are high at stake among the national representatives in the Council. As claimed 
by one of them, “credibility is something you gain if you are constructive in the 
discussions”.
38 Another one added in a similar tone: “Here, we have to join the play 
that is performed. Either we will have a role in it, or we will just be extras. If we want 
to play a role, we have to join the consensus as often as possible. This is how we build 
our position”.
39
 
One diplomat referred to two types of credibility in the Council: both personal 
and country’s credibility. Independently from the state’s credibility, once the position 
of the diplomat within the group is strong, it is generally perceived easier to negotiate 
and make one’s voice heard. In this situation increasing personal credibility is good 
for the country’s general effectiveness. Nonetheless, in some situations a 
representative is entrapped in a difficult position, where the two credibilities are in 
conflict. As one of them described such situation in which he is obliged to present 
instruction that has no chance of succeeding:  
  10“It is difficult to present instructions, knowing people around the table and knowing 
what they think about it. (…) Why should I make a fool of myself? What people do 
then, they say something like: I have here such instructions (…) and I am obliged to 
read them out… In this way, they protect themselves but not their countries.”
40  
 
This example also shows that on some occasions, individual diplomats might 
internalise the behavioural procedures and only reluctantly break the code of conduct, 
for the sake of their national position. This is due to the fact that they are embedded in 
two environments, the Brussels one and the capital one. The capital factor is a very 
important one since national representatives are watched from their MFAs and they 
have to report back. In sum, they have to be effective in their role in Brussels.  
 
Eventually, for the practitioners, it all comes down to ‘having your amendments 
approved’, which is a sign that your strategy works.
41 The credibility determines the 
effectiveness of the representative, and can be a chance for smaller Member States to 
have a stronger impact on policy-making. As one diplomat claimed: “You have 
representatives from small Member States that can make a huge impact on and you 
have representatives from big Member States (…) that in spite of the size of their 
country do not influence the negotiations”.
42 An example was given of a diplomat 
from Portugal in COWEB who influenced the negotiations helping to build the 
consensus. Another example is one of a Danish representative in PMG, who was an 
active player, even though his country has an opt-out in defence issues. 
 
A representative may however loose his/her credibility within the group by 
breaking the code of behaviour. This can happen as a result of trying to force a 
position that is very radical or simply ‘unforceable’, which is badly perceived by other 
group members. Hence, ‘later on, whatever you say, even if these are the best ideas, 
they are ignored in silence… That is why I have to build my position. Everyone has to 
know I am pragmatic and ready to negotiate’.
43 The representatives take into account 
the long-term results of the negotiations and are sometimes ready to make minimal 
concessions in their national short-term preferences. Nonetheless, this is done only if 
it improves their overall standing within the group and increases the chances of 
success regarding more important issues. This was described by one representative as 
the ability to ‘sacrifice an ill-perceived or short-term national interest in order to 
invest in long-term capacity that can be used in more important issues’.
44  
 
Different perceptions between Brussels and the capitals: who writes instructions for 
whom? 
 
A crucial question to be asked regards the position that the representatives want 
to achieve. Is it the original national position or has it been modified by their 
interactions in Brussels? As one of the diplomats admitted: “This is the first lesson 
that you learn when you come to Brussels: the toughest negotiations take place 
between the capital and Brussels”.
45 The representatives emphasize the difference 
between the perceptions of officials in Brussels and those in the capital, which 
occasionally leads to discussion over the instructions or convincing the capital that the 
instructions should be changed for the sake of the state’s credibility in the group.
46 In 
such cases they argue that the national position is not ‘quite in tune with the 
negotiating atmosphere here in Brussels’.
47 As one of them observed, this does not 
mean loosing one’s effectiveness: “I am perceived in a better light and hence my next 
  11ideas are taken into account, whereas if I am perceived as a troublemaker, who spoils 
the atmosphere and asks for impossible, they are omitted”.
48 This was also a lesson 
learnt by the representatives of the new Member States, who, as observed by their 
counterparts “make things softer, they gained some confidence and friendship with 
other colleagues and so they feel confident to present things less radical that their 
capitals might wish, but at the end they get more results.”
49 In this way, national 
diplomats are able to use their expertise and institutional position to influence not 
only European politics and decision making, but also their foreign ministries (Spence, 
2002: 33). They see themselves as the “transmission belts” of every day business in 
Brussels to their capitals.
50
 
The tension experienced by the national representatives is due to the fact that 
they are embedded in two social environments: domestic and European (Beyers, 
2002; 2005). The code of conduct associated with the latter is learnt after their arrival 
in Brussels and the first one (national) is subsequently modified. The diplomats 
sometimes act as ‘change agents’ in relation to their own national administration. The 
process starts during their stay abroad, but the influence can be exerted even stronger 
after their return to the capitals (the so called ‘contagion’ effect; see Page and 
Wouters, 1995: 197).
51 In this way, they take an active part in the process of 
Europeanisation of national foreign policies in both directions: national adaptation 
and promoting national policy goals on the European level. Those capital officials that 
spent even a few weeks training in Brussels claimed that it allowed them to see the 
work of their colleagues from different perspective and to understand better what was 
expected from the capital. Those that left the capitals and started working in Brussels 
felt the growing gap between themselves and their colleagues from the ministry. One 
of them observed that in Brussels “everything changes faster, when it comes to the 
mentality of the diplomats” and that the people in the capital “become frustrated, as 
they feel that we are getting further away and then the lack of understanding 
appears”.
52
 
There are different ways of influencing the actual substance of instructions. 
Some diplomats admit that on some occasions they are not given any precise 
instructions: “I am very happy when I don’t have instructions. Generally, when I 
receive instructions, I am much more constrained in achieving result.”
53 Depending 
on organizational structure and the strength of representative’s own position within it, 
they make sure their instructions are what they would like to receive. As one official 
clarified: “What I do is write instructions for myself. I write to [the capital] what I am 
going to do, what I am going to say and unless I get something different, I will 
proceed with this line.”
54 Several of the representatives from both, new and old 
Member States emphasized there was nothing worse than receiving “stupid” 
instructions with “crazy ideas”, which send them “to die” or “kill themselves” “with 
an instruction which is completely out of the point”.
55 Therefore, some of them admit 
they act early to prevent receiving such instructions. Nonetheless, there are also 
possibilities of negotiating the changes during the meetings of the CWGs. It is a 
common practice that the representatives either take phone calls quietly in the 
negotiation room or leave for a few minutes. The “flexibility” of instructions and the 
freedom given to the representatives varies among the Member States. For example, 
the Germans, Austrians and Swedish are usually mentioned as examples of diplomats 
with less room for manoeuvre.  
 
  12The diplomats emphasize that the capitals lack an overall feeling about the 
atmosphere in the CWG and experience regarding to what position has chances of 
getting accepted and what arguments to use in order to convince the others. Even 
though the officials from the capitals attend occasionally the meetings of the CWGs in 
the so-called capital formations, the atmosphere in such meetings is completely 
different. The representatives based in Brussels would usually also accompany the 
capital official, taking a seat behind. Reports from the CWGs meetings play an 
important role as to early warning about possible conflicts, signalling the positions of 
others as well as the most important themes for national interest. It is also worth 
mentioning that the representatives of the CWGs attend the points relevant to their 
work at the meetings of PSC or COREPER II, advising their ambassadors. Hence, 
their role is not finished when the dossier leaves the level of experts.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This contribution offered some insights into the nature of socialisation process at 
the level of experts in the CWGs. Socialisation has been widely perceived in the 
extant CFSP literature as internalisation of norms, missing possible rational 
motivations behind this process. This research however points to the fact that in the 
case of the CWGs socialisation has mainly followed a strategic calculus. It also served 
to emphasise the relevance of the lower-levels of the decision making system in the 
European foreign policy. In spite of the technical nature of the issues discussed in the 
CWGs, they still exert an impact on the direction of the EU foreign policy. A large 
bulk of the CFSP workload, such as drafting of Council Conclusions, is already 
agreed at this level and simply “rubber stamped” by higher Council bodies. On the 
other hand, national representatives not only play an important role as their capitals’ 
voices in Brussels, but also influence their masters in the Ministries. This is done 
through the process of formulating the instructions, which is based on a continuous 
dialogue with the capital.   
 
The article also identified the main practices constituting the code of conduct, 
supported with recent empirical evidence. The behavioural rules presented here 
include for example: reflex coordination, consensus building, domaines réservés, and 
maintaining consistency between different levels of decision-making. These rules are 
learnt as a result of diplomats’ participation in the CWGs. Non-compliance may 
damage the legitimacy and credibility within the group, which may decrease the 
chances of influencing the final outcome.  
 
The empirical evidence supports the argument that in most of the cases 
internalisation of behavioural rules within the CFSP CWGs has not occurred. Instead, 
the code of conduct has been applied as a part of a strategic calculus, in which 
legitimacy and credibility (of their own and of their countries), as well as the long-
term perspective of the negotiations, played a crucial role. An important factor 
explaining why the rules have not been fully internalised might be the fact that the 
diplomats are embedded in two logics. The first one comes from their capitals, 
whereas the second one is learnt upon their arrival to Brussels. This element is also 
shared with the representatives in other Council bodies such as COREPER (Lewis, 
2005). However, in the case of CFSP CWGs, the national allegiance is stronger due to 
the high levels of rotation. The shadow of the capital is always present.  
 
  13Yet, it is worthy to note some methodological challenges when trying to apply 
theory into practice and conduct empirical research on socialisation. It is difficult to 
prove whether the norm has been internalised or merely followed strategic 
calculations. If we just rely on the discourse in order to trace the utilisation of norms, 
we immediately face the question: do actors believe in what they say? Are they just 
engaged in rhetorical action? As it seems an impossible task to ‘get into people’s 
heads’, many academics limited their research to a discourse analysis, pointing out the 
importance of the language used. We argue here that while such analysis is important, 
it should be complemented by other methods. These include process tracing, elite in-
depth interviews
56 and questionnaires. The interviews should be ideally conducted 
prior the entry into a group and at a later stage, when actors have already spent some 
time in the new environment. 
 
On the other hand, variation in degrees of socialisation may be explained by 
different variables, such as the impact of previous socialisation experiences (at their 
MFAs/participation in other multilateral fora); the length of time he/she has been a 
member of the group, different national administrative cultures and trainings or even 
personal characteristics. Therefore, more comparative research is needed to examine 
socialisation affecting officials from different Member States and from different 
CWGs.  
 
The final question to be raised is whether the findings of the article bring us any 
closer to understanding the impact of different types of socialisation on 1) the policy 
process and 2) the outcome of the European foreign policy. As regards the first issue, 
socialisation has arguably changed the dynamics of the negotiation process. This is 
particularly visible in the adaptation process experienced by the newcomers after the 
last enlargement. The representatives from the new Member States have learnt to 
respect the code of conduct and hence a deadlock in the decision-making process has 
been prevented. They became less radical in presenting their positions; they seek the 
approval of their colleagues even before the formal meetings and resort to “EU 
values” to present their positions. Moreover, further research could look at the links 
between governance and the context of negotiations. For instance, how the 
enlargement, by increasing informal practices, also brought changes in modes of 
governance leading for example to more deliberative type negotiations, instead of 
bargaining-oriented ones.  
 
The impact on the policy outcome is more subtle. Because of the consensus 
oriented behaviour the final result is not just a lowest common denominator. As a 
result of the coordination reflex, national policies are formulated under different 
conditions what may also have an impact on their actual policies. For example, some 
Member States (in particular, small Member States) have gained access to more 
information from their partners what can lead to shifts in preferences or even help to 
formulate positions in those cases where they did not have one before. In sum, the 
article could serve as a starting point for a new research agenda that should start 
questioning the conception of socialisation as it has been understood in previous 
research on CFSP.  
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1 Both authors would like to express their gratitude for the kind assistance they were given by national 
representatives, as well as the EU officials, during their fieldwork in Brussels. We also thank two 
anonymous referees for their constructive comments. 
2 In the CFSP literature, it has been defined as a force shaping ‘the practices, perceptions and interests 
of policy makers’, including any possible redefinition of self-interest’ (Manners, Whitman, 2000: 7-8). 
3 Socialisation has to be also distinguished from the concept of Brusselisation (Allen, 1998: 54). The 
latter only refers to the physical transfer of the decision-making from the capitals to Brussels-based 
bodies. As such, Brusselisation does not exclude socialisation and often facilitates it. In contrast, 
Nuttall (2000) argued that Brusselisation could eventually obstruct the “reflex coordination” and the 
“club-like atmosphere” by increasing the number of actors and bureaucratization of the CFSP.  
4 According to one practitioner, “if you think you are talking just to the 25 Member States then you are 
mistaken. If you are mentioning a specific country there is 99% chance that it will reach them, even the 
same day”. Interview in Brussels. 
5 The “A” points in the GAERC agenda are points that have been already agreed in lower levels and 
they are just “formally” approved by GAERC without discussion. The “B” points are the issues on 
which the Foreign Ministers will have to concentrate to get an agreement.  
6 For example, although there were some discussions in COWEB (Western Balkans WG) about 
potential candidates for the post of the EU Special Representative in BiH, this decision could not be 
taken at the level of the CWG since it also involved negotiations with the Peace Implementation 
Council. Interviews in Brussels.  
7 There is some confusion in the literature regarding the terminology. The term Working Parties, 
according to Nuttall (2000: 249), was used with reference to the EC preparatory bodies, whereas 
Working Groups was used in the context of the EPC. They were merged with the establishment of a 
single institutional framework (Treaty of Maastricht), officially known as Standing Working Parties. 
However, both terms are in common use among the practitioners and the academics. In this article the 
term Working Groups is preferred. 
8 According to one interviewee, the last two “capitals” meetings have taken place in November 2004 
and in February 2006 respectively.  
  16                                                                                                                                            
9 As another representative claimed: “There is a kind of family atmosphere in a group, I probably 
spend more time with my group colleagues than with the other representatives from my country”. 
Interviews in Brussels.  
10 Ibid. 
11 On-line survey on Council Working Groups.  
12 Some diplomats from new Member States were surprised by the process of socialisation taking place 
at the CFSP level and would even considered it as “not the right” way of doing business in the 
international organisation (e.g. one of them was struck by the habit of addressing national 
representatives by the Presidency using their names rather than countries they represented). Interviews 
in Brussels.   
13 Interview in Warsaw.  
14 Interviews in Brussels. 
15 According to the on-line survey conducted by the authors, 17.9 % of the representatives to the CWGs 
always consult with other national delegations prior to formal meetings, and 71.4 % consult most of the 
time.  
16 Interviews in Brussels. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 On some occasions, these like-minded groups are very structured, like in the case of COWEB. In 
other cases, these groups vary depending on the issue for discussion (for example, CIVCOM or 
COEST).  
20 Interviews in Brussels. 
21 Ibid. 
22 On-line survey on Council Working Groups. 
23 Interviews in Brussels. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. 
27 According to a CWG official, the CWGs should not send to higher levels texts with technical square 
brackets, which means that you do not have an agreement because of time pressure or lack of 
information. This would be a signal of lack of effectiveness. Interviews in Brussels. 
28 Interviews in Brussels. 
29 As stated by a national diplomat: “These informal exchanges are not so important in COTRA 
because of the lack of this effect-oriented approach”. Interviews in Brussels. 
30 Ibid.  
31 On-line survey on Council Working Groups. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Interviews in Brussels. 
34 Several confidential interviews in Brussels confirmed that practice. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. Another one added in a similar tone: “I realized that since you start to be integrated within the 
group, since you start to be constructive, to be active, to make proposals, to be on the lead of things, 
instead of wait and see (…) then your credibility grows”. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Interview in Brussels. In their report from the ongoing research project Heinisch and Mesner (2005: 
15) examining the culture of COREPER negotiations refer to the “dual loyalty” of Permanent 
Representatives (PermReps). They argue that it is stronger in COREPER than in other bodies, since the 
PermReps have to defend not only the national position, but also serve the European idea. In a similar 
line to what is argued in this article, they claim that apart from negotiation success, the “willingness to 
compromise and work on joint solutions is equally important for acting successfully in COREPER and 
for gaining the respect of their colleagues” (Heinisch and Mesner 2005: 16). 
  17                                                                                                                                            
46 Some evidence of similar nature were found by Lewis (2005) and Heinish and Mesner (2005) in case 
of COREPER negotiations. 
47 Interviews in Brussels. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jeffrey Lewis (2005: 940), analyzing socialisation in COREPER, observed “the cognitive blurring of 
sharp definitional boundaries between the ‘national’ and ‘European’ frames and a shared sense of 
responsibility to deliver both home and collectively”. This, he claimed, led to complex identity 
changes. Hence, “COREPER’s Janus-like design is an anomaly for theorists who draw rigid 
distinctions between ‘national’ and ‘supranational’ agency” (Lewis, 2005: 967). 
51 On the other hand, some argued that the effects of socialisation process in Brussels, on example of 
COREPER, can be “undone” (Lewis, 2005: 968). 
52 Interviews in Brussels. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Unfortunately, interviewing diplomats poses several practical problems. The rotation in Working 
Groups is high, with people being moved between capitals and Brussels. Getting an access for 
conducting such in-depth, repetitive, usually long-lasting sociological analysis, keeping track of the 
changing group’s members, would require a long-term project. 
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